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Abstract 
This paper seeks to shed light on the question of the likely evolution of collective 
bargaining in Europe under EMU by considering the experiences of two countries (Italy 
and Spain) in which governments and social actors attempted to decentralized collective 
bargaining during the 1980s only to opt in favor of a re-centralization of bargaining 
during the 1990s.   The paper argues that the experiences of Italy and Spain offer two 
kinds of insights for our understanding of the future evolution of wage bargaining in the 
EU. On the one hand, they illustrate why governments and social actors may come to 
favor a consolidation of the structure of bargaining under EMU rather than opt for a 
further decentralization of bargaining. On the other hand, they also suggest that any such 
process of consolidation faces great obstacles in moving beyond the national level.  The 
recent experiences of Italy and Spain thus lead us to conclude that the most likely 
outcome in the EU is that of a reaffirmation of the national and national/sectoral-levels of 
bargaining within member states, rather than either a radical decentralization of 
bargaining across the EU, or an effective shift to EU-level bargaining.  
Driven largely by political, rather than economic, imperatives, European Monetary Union 
(EMU) represents a change in the structure of economic governance in Europe whose 
consequences remain uncertain. The change is a profound one not only because it shifts a 
key element of economic policy from the jurisdiction of governments to a supra-national 
level, but also because it fundamentally alters the relationship between monetary policy 
and other elements of economic governance that have undergone no similar 
centralization. Most often noted among these is fiscal policy, which remains in the hands 
of the individual member states, presenting a problem of coordination with monetary 
policy. Yet there are other important variables upon which the effects of the new 
monetary regime are likely to hinge. As a recent body of work by political scientists and 
economists suggests, the effects of a given monetary policy regime may depend strongly 
on the structure of the collective bargaining process upon which monetary policy 
impinges. The consequences of EMU thus are likely to depend on the way in which 
collective bargaining, which for now remains highly differentiated across the member 
states, takes shape in the EMU area.  
While there is nothing to guarantee that collective bargaining in the member states 
will evolve in any uniform way or toward any coherent pattern, we can distinguish 
among several possible future outcomes. One is a simple perpetuation of the current 
pattern of variation in collective bargaining regimes across member states. The second is 
a progressive decentralization of bargaining toward the firm-level across the member 
states. The third is the opposite of the second, a rise of collective bargaining from the 
national, national-sectoral, and lower levels at which most collective bargaining now 
takes place in the EU to the European sectoral level coupled perhaps with some form of 
cross-sectoral framework bargaining between the European trade union and employer 
associations (ETUC and UNICE). A fourth possible trend is that of a resurgence of 
national social pacts (or framework bargaining) on wages and other issues. The last of 
these possibilities would in essence turn collective bargaining into a de facto substitute 
for the national monetary policy capabilities that have been abandoned.  
Whichever of these trends comes to dominate collective bargaining under EMU is 
likely to have important repercussions for the effectiveness of the ECB’s policies. The 
degree of coordination among economic actors that the overall system of collective 
bargaining does (or does not) allow, and the extent to which it reflects the interests of 
exposes as opposed to sheltered sectors, are likely to be particularly important in this 
regard. Indeed, social actors across Europe may well be influenced by their experience in 
dealing with a new supra-national central bank in seeking different bargaining  
arrangements. At the same time, however, collective bargaining developments will have 
to respond to intense differences in the preferences of bargaining actors across Europe. 
One particularly important cleavage in this regard is likely to be that between unions and 
employers in the EU’s high wage/high productivity growth vs. low wage and productivity 
growth countries. Another is that between countries where employers and unions may be 
capable of arriving at acceptable bargaining outcomes in the absence of some form of 
national framework bargaining (or concertation) and those where recent experiences have 
led to the pursuit of such national bargains to compensate for the lack of such 
capabilities.  
This paper seeks to shed light on the question of the future evolution of collective 
bargaining in Europe by considering the experiences of two countries that can be said to 
fall within the latter categories: Italy and Spain.  The paper argues that the recent 
experiences of Italy and Spain offer two kinds of insights for our understanding of the 
future evolution of wage bargaining in the EU. On the one hand, they illustrate why 
governments and social actors may come to favor a consolidation of the structure of 
bargaining under EMU rather than opt for a further decentralization of bargaining. On the 
other hand, they also suggest that any such process of consolidation faces great obstacles 
in moving beyond the national level.  The recent experiences of Italy and Spain thus lead 
us to conclude that the most likely outcome in the EU is that of a reaffirmation of the 
national and national-sectoral-levels of bargaining within member states, rather than 
either a radical decentralization of bargaining across the EU, or an effective shift to EU-
level bargaining.  
The paper proceeds in three steps. The first section sets out the problematic of the 
relationship between collective bargaining and the move to monetary union in the EU. In 
the second and third sections, I review the recent Italian and Spanish experiences, - which 
have involved a shift in favor of a re-centralization of bargaining coupled with 
framework bargaining at the center after a period of decentralization and fragmentation in 
bargaining in the 1980s- and seek to explain these experiences. In the last section I focus 
on the lessons that we may draw from the experiences of these two Southern European 
countries for our understanding of the future evolution of collective bargaining in the EU.   
I. EMU and the problem of Wage Bargaining Structure  
As a number of authors have noted, there is much to suggest that European Monetary 
Union has been driven by underlying political, rather than economic, considerations on 
the part of governments in the EU (see in particular Boyer, 1998). Nonetheless, public 
acceptance of the project has rested on the notion that monetary union will have positive 
effects on the future economic performance of the EU.  Two kinds of arguments are 
typically offered to justify the move to monetary union in this sense. The first is that 
monetary union will boost investment and growth (and by implication employment) in 
the EU by eliminating the transaction costs involved in dealing in separate currencies and 
by creating greater transparency in prices and thus promoting the further integration of 
financial and product markets. While this first argument relies on sheer market forces, the 
second argument has more to do with the institutional design of EMU. It involves the 
often unquestioned notion that the shift to a single monetary authority modeled on the 
German Bundesbank will allow for an extension of the German model of economic 
governance - and of the outcomes associated with that model  (low inflation, real wage 
moderation, low unemployment (until 1992) and strong export performance) - to the EU 
as a whole. In this way, it is thought, EU states will be able to supersede the economic 
results achieved previously through currency arrangements (i.e. the ERM) which were 
proving increasingly costly and untenable in the face of increased cross-border capital 
flows.  
There is however, strong reason to believe that this second premise for EMU 
stands on very shaky ground. A recent body of work by sociologists, political scientists, 
and economists suggests that the relatively benign effects of the German model of macro-
economic governance - centering on a highly independent and non-accommodating 
central bank - have depended son other features of the institutional context in which that 
central bank operated. Chief among these are two features of the German collective 
bargaining system: the high degree of coordination among employers and among unions 
in the wage bargaining process (see Hall, 1994), and, related though analytically distinct 
from the first, the leadership of export industry in the wage-setting process (see Streeck, 
1994).   A number of studies have also found support for these observations based on  
cross-national and pooled time-series data for OECD countries. Soskice and Iversen 
(forthcoming), for example, find that a non-accommodating monetary policy stance such 
as that pursued by the Bundesbank is capable of inducing real wage moderation (and 
hence a lower equilibrium rate of unemployment) only in countries with a limited (and 
presumably coordinated) number of wage-setters; a finding that they attribute to the fact 
that unions are likely to seek lower real wage increases when they know that higher 
increases will not be accommodated.
1 Based on similar data, Hall and Franzese (1998), 
conclude that the employment cost of a non-accommodating monetary policy is directly 
(and inversely) related to measures of coordination in wage bargaining, a fact that they 
attribute to the ability of unions in coordinated settings to know that their wage 
settlements will have a direct impact on prices, and hence to heed signals from the central 
bank. “In uncoordinated settings,” by contrast, “wage bargainers are unlikely to be highly 
responsive to threats from the fiscal or monetary authorities.” Another study (Franzese, 
1999) on the other hand, finds that these interactive effects between levels of 
coordination in wage bargaining and monetary policy regimes themselves depend on the 
influence of exposed vs. sheltered sectors in wage setting.  
Neither of the two conditions identified in this work as critical in supporting the 
outcomes of the Bundesbank’s policies in Germany (a highly coordinated bargaining 
structure and export sector leadership in wage-setting) holds true for the structure of 
collective bargaining in which the ECB will be operating (that of the Euro-zone as a 
whole). The present structure of collective bargaining in the EMU-zone is far more 
fragmented than that upon which the Bundesbank operated.
2 The area not only includes 
countries with far more fragmented, and less coordinated, bargaining structures than 
Germany had in the past. More importantly, even the most encompassing unions in 
                                                 
1 Iversen (1998), however, also finds that this positive effect may turn into a negative effect at 
very high levels of wage bargaining centralization, such as was typical of Sweden in the past.  
2 It might be argued (as do Soskice and Iversen, 1998) that the Bundesbank operated throughout 
the ERM area via the exchange rate commitment as the sole monetary authority in the EMU area. 
However, this required that national central banks fit their policies to those of the Bundesbank to 
maintain those commitments and it did not require the Bundesbank to respond to inflation rates in 
other ERM countries, allowing German unions to presume that their wage moderation would in 
fact serve to avoid interest rate hikes.    
countries such as Germany now represent a far smaller fraction of the workers affected 
by a given interest rate hike. Given that there is no established hierarchy in bargaining 
across the EU, these unions now can be less sure that an offer of wage restraint on their 
part will be seconded by other unions in the area and thus ensure the pay-off (no interest 
rate hike). They may therefore be less inclined to pursue solidaristic wage policies. 
Secondly, with the move to a single currency, a lesser proportion of employers and 
workers in the EU will be vulnerable to the threat of currency appreciation (one of the 
main elements whereby the Bundesbank is said to have induced wage restraint in 
Germany in the past).  In the more fragmented bargaining context of the EU, this is likely 
to make it more difficult for those sectors or businesses still exposed to the threat of 
currency appreciation to maintain their present level of influence in the wage setting 
process. All this suggests that the established patterns of coordination between the 
dominant monetary authority and lead wage setters in the EU is likely to be severely 
disrupted by the move to a single currency. And much will therefore depend on how the 
structure of collective bargaining across the EU evolves (or does not evolve) in relation to 
this disruption.  
Collective bargaining arrangements have, in fact, been undergoing a period of 
marked change in several EU countries. The most oft noted development in this regard 
has been the abandonment of centralized wage bargaining in Sweden and Denmark in the 
1980s, as well as the move to decentralize bargaining on work conditions other than 
wages in several other countries (notably Germany and Italy) (see Katz, 1993; Freeman 
and Gibbons, 1995; Iversen, 1996; Thelen, 1991; Regini, 1995). These instances of 
decentralization are often thought to support the notion that the bases for centralized 
bargaining have been undermined by the integration of international financial markets 
and by recent changes in production regimes and occupational structures. And they might 
well lead us to expect that, given the incoherence of the present monetary 
policy/collective bargaining structure, EMU will be accompanied by a generalized shift 
away from centralized bargaining in favor of a more decentralized bargaining structure 
modeled on that of the United States (and more recently, the UK).  Following the view of 
alternative high employment equilibria laid out in Calmfors and Driffil (1988) and 
Iversen (1998), this would imply that economic adjustment under EMU would be  
achieved by a shift away from an intermediate bargaining structure to a far more 
decentralized one that would approximate competitive labor market structure of the 
United States.  
However, there is reason to believe that the current dynamic of change in 
collective bargaining across the EU is considerably more complex than these instances of 
decentralization alone suggest.  A recent study of collective bargaining trends by the 
OECD (1997) found no clear trend toward a decentralization of bargaining, as measured 
either in terms of the level of bargaining at which most wages are set or measures of 
coordination in bargaining.  It recorded a far more complex pattern with some countries 
(in particular Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK) experiencing a notable 
decentralization, while others (including Italy, Norway, and Portugal) have moved in the 
direction of more centralization and/or coordination , while in many others there was 
little change (see p. 74). Another set of studies (Wallerstein and Golden, 1997; and 
Wallerstein, Golden, and Lange, 1997) also finds no clear trend toward a decentralization 
of bargaining in either the Nordic, or Central European countries, or the OECD at large. 
(Indeed, Wallerstein and Golden, 1997 note that there has be a recent consolidation in the 
bargaining structure of Denmark, one of the cases often highlighted in support of the 
view that economic change is forcing a decentralization of bargaining). Other work 
highlights the decidedly limited and controlled nature of bargaining decentralization in 
Germany, in particular the fact that this decentralization has not extended to wage 
bargaining (Katz, 1993; Thelen, forthcoming).  And, as a number of other authors have 
noted, there has been a very prominent return to the use of national social pacts on wages 
and other issues in several European countries as an alternative means of imposing 
coordination (see in particular Hassel, 1998; Pérez, forthcoming).  
These developments suggest that there is more than one logic at work in driving 
changes in collective bargaining in the EU today and that current trends do not 
necessarily foretell a shift in favor of decentralization. Indeed, as Robert Boyer (1998) 
has recently noted, there are a number of different outcomes toward which changes in 
bargaining regimes across the EU may lead. These include, along with the possibility of a 
radical decentralization of bargaining (or in Boyer’s parlance, “company-ism”), a  
diametrically opposite outcome: namely the possibility of a shift to European level 
bargaining (at either the sectoral level, or a central European level).
3  Such a development 
would imply that the structure of collective bargaining in the EU would be responding to 
the change in the scope of the monetary policy regime that has already taken place, 
allowing possibly for a replication of the German model of a non-accommodating 
monetary policy within a highly coordinated wage bargaining framework. 
However, any collective bargaining regime that evolves in the EMU area will 
have to address significant differences in bargaining conditions across the area.  Two 
such differences are those pertaining to productivity levels and growth rates, and those 
pertaining to the organizational structure and capacities of bargaining actors in different 
areas.  Differences in productivity levels and growth rates are likely to make it difficult 
for each bargaining side (employers and unions) to agree on common bargaining position 
(or wage norm) in anticipation of the ECB’s policies. Differences in organizational 
structure (in particular the capacity of unions and employers to maintain a level of 
coordination in the absence of certain kinds of existing domestic bargaining arrangements 
(such as framework bargaining, or “concertation”) will make it difficult for agreement to 
be reached on the most suitable structure of bargaining beyond the national level.  
   More specifically, two cleavages are likely to become important in any attempt 
to agree on new bargaining arrangements in the EU. The first is that between countries 
where employers and unions can agree to peg their wage bargaining demands to those of 
a lead country (Germany) either explicitly (as has been done most recently in Belgium, 
where since 1996 intersectoral collective agreements have pegged maximum salary wage 
increases to weighted average hourly wage increase in Belgium’s three biggest trading 
                                                 
3 Boyer also notes the possibility of three other outcomes:  that of collective bargaining 
dominated by bargaining within large European multinationals (xeno-corporatism), 
which he sees happening only to a limited extent, that of a resurgence of national-level 
corporatism (an outcome which he deems possible), and that of a nested (or multiple tier) 
system of bargaining combining these different levels, and in which European-level 
negotiations would focus on prices and wages, national-level bargaining on welfare 
provisions, and firm-level bargaining on distributing profits (or productivity gains). In the 
latter case, he notes the difficulty of achieving a full articulation of such a system at the  
partners, Germany, France, and the Netherlands) or implicitly (as appears to be the case 
in France, where overall wage increases, driven largely through adjustments in the 
minimal wage, commonly mirror developments in Germany) and countries where 
employers would find any such peg incompatible with the need to maintain 
competitiveness.  This conflict is particularly likely given that EMU includes a number of 
countries that in the past relied heavily on periodic devaluations (even within the ERM) 
to restore competitiveness. The second major cleavage is likely to be that between 
countries in which a shift in bargaining to a level beyond the national one is compatible 
with the organizational agenda of domestic actors and countries in which this is not the 
case. Such a shift may be particularly difficult for employers and unions that face weak or 
divided organizational structures at home and which have come to rely on a particular 
pattern of bargaining arrangements at home (such as, for example, framework bargaining 
at the national level) to compensate for such organizational characteristics.  
In the following section, we examine the recent experiences of two countries that 
may be said to fall into the latter of these categories: Italy and Spain.  Until recently, the 
conventional wisdom in the comparative literature held these countries to be destined for 
a course of deregulation and decentralization in bargaining, given the lack of 
encompassing social actors and of well institutionalized patterns of coordination in 
bargaining. Such an outcome, it would seem, would also limit the chance of achieving a 
consolidated, EU-wide wage-bargaining structure under EMU. At the very least, it would 
seem to imply an institutional schism within the EMU area in which some countries (the 
so-called organized economies of Northern and Central Europe) might consolidate their 
wage-bargaining structures, creating a bloc of wage setters that the ECB would target, 
while others would simply adjust by moving to a highly decentralized and deregulated 
model of industrial relations.  However, a review of recent developments in these 
countries does not support this conventional wisdom. Indeed, while these countries 
underwent a period of de-centralization in bargaining in the mid to late eighties coupled 
with attempts to impose wage discipline through monetary policy measures, they have 
more recently undergone a significant process of re-consolidation and re-centralization in 
                                                                                                                                                 
European level.   
their domestic bargaining structures. These experiences suggest that the “South” or 
“periphery” of the EMU will not necessarily be a force for deregulation in the area. And, 
as the following sections will argue, they may also be instructive in other ways for our 
understanding of the broader dynamic of change in bargaining institutions in the EMU-
area.  
 
II. Italy and Spain: from decentralization to re-organization 
Despite important differences in the post-war histories of the two countries (in 
particular those that followed from the difference in political regimes after the war), the 
contemporary industrial relations regimes of Italy and Spain share some important 
characteristics. The three most important of these for present purposes are 1) the 
historically divided nature of the labor movement, which places rival national labor 
confederations in the position of vying for membership with each other; 2) the highly 
politicized, yet not highly institutionalized nature of industrial relations until very 
recently; and 3) the (also until very recently) very fragmented and multi-tiered structure 
of collective bargaining. This history of division within the labor movement, of poorly 
institutionalized industrial relations, and of fragmentation and duplication in bargaining 
structure is generally thought to limit the ability of labor unions to act as strategic actors 
in the economy, and it leads these countries to be commonly categorized as “under-
organized” economies that are ill-fitted (from an institutional standpoint) for the pursuit 
of negotiated adjustment policies.  
     Up until the 1990s, the evolution of industrial relations in Italy and Spain 
seemed to confirm this diagnosis. In the 1970s and 1980s both countries attempted 
negotiated incomes policies, yet both experiments ended in failure. In Italy, this effort 
involved two attempts to establish a stable process of framework wage bargaining. The first 
led to an agreement in 1977, in which the three major union confederations (CGIL, CISL, 
and UIL) agreed to voluntary wage restraint in return for macro-economic policy 
concessions, a law on industrial restructuring, and the PCI’s de facto participation in 
government. Yet it ended in 1979, when the PCI was forced out of the ruling Center-Left  
parliamentary alliance and employers toughened their position. Formal tripartite 
negotiations were reinitiated in 1983, leading to an historic incomes policy agreement that 
centered on the revision of the scala mobile (the automatic wage floor indexation scheme, 
which had been revised in 1975 so as to allow for a substantial upward wage compression). 
However, disagreement over the implementation of the 1983 agreement led to a split among 
the unions, and when the Communist wing of the CGIL refused to sign a new agreement in 
1984, this second attempt at concertation also came to an end (Flanagan, Soskice, and 
Ulman, 1983: 546-56; Regini, 1984).  
The Spanish experience with concertation in the 1970s and 1980s was more 
successful than the Italian, in the sense that a negotiated incomes policy was effectively 
sustained for almost a decade (from 1978-1986). This incomes policy process began with 
the Pactos de la Moncloa of 1978, which were signed by all major political parties as part of 
the political regime transition, and continued with a series of subsequent agreements that 
covered wages from 1980 through1986 (with the exception of 1984). All of these 
agreements were signed by the Socialist labor confederation (UGT) and the national 
employer association (CEOE), although not by the Communist labor confederation 
(CCOO), which refused to sign the agreements that covered wages for 1980-81 and 1985-
86. Nevertheless, because Spanish legislation creates strong incentives for workers to adhere 
to any agreement signed by any representative union, actual wage settlements remained 
within the negotiated ranges for as long as the national agreements were in effect. Following 
a failed attempt to reach a new agreement for 1987-1988, however, the UGT decided to join 
the CCOO in its more militant stance, and in late 1988 the two confederations staged a 
general strike against the government. Thereafter, several attempts by the Socialist 
government to reestablish the negotiated incomes policy process failed to bring the unions 
back into the fold (Gillespie, 1990; Espina, 1991; Pérez, 1999). 
The collapse of these concertation experiments was followed by a period of 
decentralization in bargaining in the two countries.  In Italy, an increasing number of 
firms opted to rely on firm-level bargaining not just to negotiate more flexible work 
conditions but also to broaden wage differentials during the 1980s (see Erickson and 
Ichino, 1995). This rise in firm-level bargaining (or micro-concertation) disrupted the  
traditional pattern of bargaining in Italy, in which wages (or contractual minima) were set 
primarily at the national sectoral level and then adjusted further via the scala mobile. 
Indeed, in a number of sectors, national agreements either failed to be reached during this 
period or followed the terms of local agreements that had been negotiated previously. 
Given that there was no clear division of labor among bargaining levels and that the new 
firm-level bargaining continued to coexist with other levels of bargaining (sectoral and 
provincial agreements), wages-setting was in many cases subject to several consecutive 
and overlapping bargaining levels (see Katz, 1993; Negrelli, and Santi, 1990; Regalia and 
Regini, 1992). In Spain, the end of concertation in 1986 led collective bargaining to 
default to the underlying bargaining structure inherited from the Franco period, which, 
with a few exceptions (the banking sector, for example, which was subject to national 
sectoral bargains), dominated by a large number of  provincial-sectoral bargains.  In both 
cases, the main characteristic of bargaining during this period (lasting from 1984 through 
1992 in Italy, and from 1987 through 1994 in Spain) was the increased level of 
fragmentation in wage bargaining, and the absence of any effective coordination by either 
employers or unions across bargaining units.  
This shift in favor of a more decentralized bargaining structure in the mid 1980s 
appeared consistent with the notion that, given a lack of institutional conditions for 
concertation, economic pressures would push these countries down a path of 
decentralization in bargaining and deregulation of industrial relations similar to that 
followed by Britain in the 1980s. However, since the early 1990s, the evolution of 
collective bargaining in both countries has taken a markedly different turn.  This has 
included a return to framework bargaining on wages and other issues at the center, a 
notable, if still incomplete, consolidation and articulation of the underlying bargaining structure, 
and an increased formalization of bargaining practices throughout the economy.  
This turn of events has been most explicit and dramatic in the Italian case. In spite of the 
growing trend toward firm-level bargaining in the 1980s, by the end of the decade, national-level 
negotiations to control the cost of labor had resumed. Two agreements, signed in 1990 and 1991, 
remained at the level of declarations of principle because of persisting disagreement over the 
reform of the scala mobile. However, in 1992, in the context of a mounting economic and  
political crisis, the unions agreed to the abolition of the scala mobile and to a two-year freeze on 
company level bargaining to support the governments’ emergency program of fiscal 
consolidation (Regini and Regalia, 1997).  A year later, in 1993, a new tripartite agreement was 
signed which institutionalized the new incomes policy framework, and for the first time 
attributed distinct roles to different levels of bargaining, with the principal purpose of achieving 
a higher degree of coordination in wage setting. According to the new system, national sectoral 
bargains (which are subject to national inter-sectoral framework discussions) set wage increases 
in line with expected inflation while lower-level bargains (at either the firm or locality level) 
determine pay scales and distribute additional productivity gains. This formalization of a now 
clearly articulated and streamlined two-level wage bargaining structure subjected to an 
overarching incomes policy framework has created a more stable and institutionalized system of 
industrial relations than had previously been achieved in Italy. And it was reaffirmed in the 1998 
“patto di Natale” with one major innovation: namely, that national level agreements should 
henceforth use the European (rather than the Italian) inflation rate as their referent. Lastly, the 
new system of national framework bargaining (which involves two annual meetings to “`define 
common objectives concerning the expected inflation rate, growth of GDP and employment’ 
and `to verify the coherence of behavior by the parties engaged’”) also made possible an historic 
agreement between the government and the unions on pension reform in 1995 (Locke and 
Baccaro, 1996; Regini, 1997; Regini and Regalia, 1997; Rhodes, 1998; Negrelli, 1998). 
The turn of events in the Spanish case has been somewhat less dramatic than in Italy. 
There has been, as of yet, no return to a formally negotiated overarching incomes policy at the 
national level. The last attempt to reach such an agreement ended in failure when the PSOE 
government decided to impose a major package of labor market reforms abolishing all 
remaining labor ordinances unilaterally in 1994, setting off another general strike by the unions. 
However, in the period since the standoff over labor market reform, the industrial relations 
climate in Spain has experienced a very significant transformation: one that has included a 
resumption of framework bargaining at the center, as well as a notable, if still young, effort to 
concentrate the underlying structure of collective bargaining. Following the 1994 general strike, 
employers and unions signed an agreement to regulate the devolution of regulatory 
competencies to the collective bargaining process, defying the expectations of those (including 
union leaders) who had feared that the loss of the labor ordinances would produce a deregulatory 
spiral. Far from a Thatcherite deregulation or Swedish employers’ offensive, the main effect of  
the 1994 reform has been to de-politicize the industrial relations environment and to galvanize 
employers and union leaders into a more steady and collaborative process of negotiations. The 
collective bargaining process has gained in importance, not just because the number of firms 
covered by such agreements has further increased, but, more importantly, because employers 
and unions have begun to negotiate on a far wider range of issues (UGT, 1998; CEOE, 1999; 
CES 1996; 1998). 
Since the Socialist electoral defeat in 1996, there has been a steady stream of further 
national agreements: one, in 1996, between the new conservative government and the unions, on 
pension reform, and a major, three-part agreement between the employers and the unions in 
1997. The latter included an agreement to reduce dismissal costs for permanent workers, a 
second agreement to address any items left uncovered by the repeal of the labor ordinances and 
not re-covered through the collective bargaining process, and a third agreement to set in motion 
a re-organization of the structure of collective bargaining. The agreement on dismissal costs 
addressed one of the most contentious issues in Spanish industrial relations for over a decade: 
one that the unions had refused to negotiate on under the Socialist government.
4 Lastly, there has 
been an additional agreement between the government and the labor unions to increase benefits 
and employment conditions for part-time workers in late 1998 (El Pais, October 29 and 30, 1998). 
  Although the new social pacts in Spain have not included a return to formal incomes 
policy agreements, several developments indicate a serious effort to re-centralize and coordinate 
the wage bargaining process by other means. This effort can be observed in the evolution of 
wage bargaining since the 1994 labor reform. Although that reform seemed to encourage a 
decentralization of bargaining by allowing lower level bargains to override higher level ones, the 
trend in collective bargaining since the implementation of the law has been in an opposite 
direction. While the number of agreements reached at the firm level increased from 2642 in 
1993 to 3313 in 1997, the proportion of workers covered by these agreements decreased from 
13.5 to 11 percent. There has also been an increase in the number of agreements reached at the 
regional (autonomous community) level. However, the proportion of workers covered by these 
                                                 
4 The quid pro quo for the unions was a promise by employers to convert a significant number of 
temporary contracts (legalized by the PSOE government in 1984 and accounting for over a third 
of total employment contracts by the late 1980s) into open-ended ones along with government 
incentives (reduced social security tax contributions) for new hires with permanent contracts.   
agreements rose by just over 2% between 1994 and 1997, to only 5% of the total. The single 
most significant shift in the structure of collective bargaining has been rather from the 
provincial-sectoral level, at which most workers were covered prior to the reform, in favor of 
new national sectoral agreements. The coverage of the latter has steadily risen from 22 percent 
of workers in 1993 to 31 percent in 1997 (the last year for which figures are available) (CES, 
1997; Ministerio de Trabajo, 1998). This upward shift in the territorial structure of bargaining 
has been accompanied by a gradual process of consolidation in the extremely large number of 
sectoral divisions around which collective bargaining is organized in Spain, the most recent 
example of which is a framework agreement reached by the UGT and CC.OO. with Confemetal 
(the sectoral employer association) to consolidate collective bargaining in the metalworking 
sector (EIRR, May 1998). 
  This process of centralization and consolidation in the structure of collective 
bargaining since the early 1990s has occurred on a voluntary, sector by sector basis in Spain. 
It has not involved the kind of mandated, systemic re-organization of collective bargaining 
that followed from the 1993 agreement in Italy. However, the 1997 agreement between the 
unions and employers in Spain (supported by public policy measures, although not signed, by 
the new government) clearly indicates the desire by both parties to achieve such a 
reorganization.
5 Although, the agreement does not mandate changes (this is made very 
difficult in Spain by the conflict between national sectoral and regional, cross-sectoral 
federations within both the labor unions and the employers
6), it states the intention of both the 
CEOE and the national labor confederations to redress the high level of fragmentation in 
collective bargaining. And it commits them to seek a re-organization of the process that 
generalizes the trend described above by giving a primary role to national-sectoral bargains 
in setting framework conditions (including wage increases) for lower level bargaining, while 
leaving open the possibility that such national agreements remit particular items (such as pay 
scales) to lower bargaining units (CEOE, 1997; ABC, September 4, 1997).  The agreement 
                                                 
5 While the conservative government was heavily engaged in promoting bi-partite negotiations 
between the employers and unions, it also insisted on the principle that it should not be an official 
party to the negotiations in order to de-politicize the collective bargaining process.  
6 This explanation for why a reorganization was not simply mandated was offered by Manuel 
Garnacho, of the UGT, and by a key staff member at the CEOE who would only talk on the basis 
of anonymity, during interviews with the author in Madrid, November 1998.     
thus bears a striking resemblance in its intentions (though not in its legal nature) to the Italian 
agreement of 1993.  
Lastly, there are also indications that the national labor confederations have been 
exercising a significant measure of cross-sectoral coordination in wage bargaining as part of 
their new relationship with employers. In the wage round that followed the 1997 labor market 
agreement, the unions significantly moderated their demands, asking for wage increases that 
were minimally above expected inflation for 1998, and, with few exceptions, recent wage 
settlements have reflected this criterion (EIRR, December 1997 and February 1998; El Pais, 
August 4, 1998). A similarly coordinated reduction in bargaining demands could be observed 
three years earlier, following the initiation of talks on regulating the abolition of the labor 
ordinances between the CEOE, UGT, and CC.OO (See El Pais, March 29, April 7 and 10; and 
June 10 and 11, 1994). Thus, while the national unions have eschewed a return to formal 
incomes policy agreements, which are associated by many of their members with the 
negative experiences of the 1980s, they have been taking responsibility for instrumenting an 
informal incomes policy since 1994. 
III. Explaining the institutional reversal in the two countries 
This turn in the direction of institutional change in the two Southern European 
countries is of particular significance for two principal reasons. The first is that the return to 
framework bargaining at the center and the accompanying effort to consolidate the 
underlying structure of wage bargaining following a period in which wage bargaining had 
been allowed to take place in a more decentralized manner occurred precisely at a time when 
both countries faced a sharp intensification in the process of integration of European and 
international financial markets. Secondly, the developments described above have involved 
an important qualitative change in the orientation of national bargaining. Whereas the 
concertation agreements of the past centered on a political exchange of wage restraint in 
return for government policy concessions (in particular social spending), the agreements of 
the 1990’s have centered on procedural features of the industrial relations framework. The 
developments of the last few years also reflect a clear move to deepen the institutional bases 
for concertation by the major actors in these countries. The decision to establish a more 
orderly division of labor among different levels of bargaining and the move to give a primary 
role to national sectoral agreements in setting wage increases, although still incipient in  
Spain, represent efforts to create structures of coordination that can provide greater 
institutional backbone for framework agreements reached at the center. Thus, whereas the 
national concertation agreements of the past may have constituted ad hoc measures to 
compensate for the absence of structures of coordination at other levels, the new concertation 
agreements come closer to fitting Traxler’s description of “’key pacts’ [that give] birth to 
corporatist institutions.”(1997: 28)  
Given the widespread notion that increased financial and product market 
integration favor a decentralization of bargaining and a deregulation of labor markets, 
how are we to explain this reversal in the course of industrial relations in Italy and Spain? 
To be sure, many of the changes in labor market regulation implemented in the two countries 
over the last decade have been aimed at promoting greater flexibility in labor costs and work 
conditions (the abolishment of the scala mobile in Italy; the abandonment of statutory labor 
ordinances and the reduction in dismissal costs in Spain, for example). This has also been one of 
the aims of the new division of labor in collective bargaining instituted in Italy, since the new 
two-level structure specifically leaves the distribution of productivity gains to the second 
(usually firm) level of bargaining. However, the most important of these regulatory 
breakthroughs have been accomplished only through the return to bargaining at the center.
7 
Moreover, this return to bargaining at the national level has been accompanied, as noted, by 
ongoing efforts to consolidate the underlying bargaining structure so that national sectoral 
bargains hold primacy over lower levels of bargaining in the wage setting process. How are we 
to explain this re-centralization of the bargaining process?  
  One possible answer that has been offered by some authors is that the return to national 
level bargaining in the 1990s after a period of decentralization was simply a function of the 
effort by governments and employers to ensure their countries’ participation in EMU. Faced 
with the deadline to meet the EMU convergence criteria, so goes this argument, Italian and 
Spanish authorities sought agreement with the unions as a way to break persisting standoffs over 
pension and labor market reforms.
8 If this were all that was motivating governments and 
                                                 
7 The abolishment of labor ordinances in Spain is an exception, but it too has contributed to elevating 
the role of collective bargaining in the economy. 
8 In the Italian case, this effort to gain the unions’ consent is also said to have been encouraged by the 
political crisis, which challenged the legitimacy of public authorities and employers. who were hit by  
employers, then the return to centralized bargaining and to a more collaborative stance would 
prove a temporary phenomena, and developments in the longer-term should bear out the 
conventional prediction of a deregulatory shift in these countries. 
However, while this explanation is intuitively appealing, it fails to account for important 
aspects of the developments described above. There is little doubt that the imperative to meet the 
EMU criteria gave Italian and Spanish authorities an important new motive to seek agreements 
with the unions. This motive seems particularly relevant, for example, in explaining the decision 
by governments to seek agreements on pension reform. However, other aspects of the 
developments described above cannot as easily be accounted for in these terms. The 
institutionalization of a national incomes policy framework in Italy and the move in both 
countries to give national-sectoral (rather than lower level) bargaining a primary role in wage 
setting are two examples. Given the notion that wage restraint in under-organized economies is 
best achieved through a decentralization of bargaining, it is unclear how the short-term objective 
of meeting the EMU deadline would lead governments and employers to favor (or even agree 
to) a re-centralization of collective bargaining.  
Some observers of the European industrial relations scene have pointed to other, more 
fundamental causes for the revival of concertation in the 1990s. Marino Regini, for example, 
argues that the return to concertation in Italy reflects the renewed importance of the “state” arena 
in the competitiveness of businesses. While the agenda of Italian employers in the 1980s focused 
on the problem of flexibility in wages and hiring practices, new production technologies in 
internationally competitive sectors were increasing the need for cooperative relations within 
firms. The result during the late 1980s was a surge in consultative management practices (or 
micro-concertation) in the more competitive and innovative firms. But by the end of the decade, 
the need to control costs had led Confindustria and Intersind (the public enterprise association) 
to seek to raise this cooperation to a higher level, leading eventually to the government-brokered 
incomes policy deals of 1992 and 1993 Regini, 1997; Regini and Regalia, 1997; Regini 1995). 
Unlike the political exchanges of the past, the new Italian concertation process, Regini argues, 
constitutes an institutional mechanism to support international competitiveness through 
consultative practices that are able to generate social consensus.  
                                                                                                                                                 
corruption scandals and hence sought the unions’ collaboration to legitimize though fiscal measures  
A slightly different version of this argument is forwarded by Martin Rhodes (1998), who 
argues that the new corporatism exemplified by Italy is made necessary by the conflict between 
two countervailing economic pressures: the need to control costs, which induces employers to 
seek external labor market flexibility (i.e. flexibility in hiring practices), and the need for 
cooperative relations within firms which can facilitate internal flexibility but are easily 
undermined by excessive external flexibility. The new “competitive” corporatism in Europe, 
Rhodes argues, reflects an attempt by employers to reconcile these two needs (limiting the 
reliance on external flexibility in order to maintain cooperative relations within firms while 
controlling costs in order to remain competitive). 
  The analyses of Regini and Rhodes offer powerful counter-arguments to the notion that 
international economic pressures unambiguously favor the deregulatory path followed by Britain 
in the 1980s. Controlling costs by limiting employment protection and dismantling consultative 
mechanisms inside and outside firms may not be worth loosing the cooperative attitude from 
workers that allows firms to adjust their production practices and compete on quality rather than 
price. However, it is not entirely clear how this micro-economically based explanation of the 
need for cooperation within firms explains the return to bargaining over wages and employment 
conditions at the national level. After all, one of the principal arguments in favor of 
decentralized bargaining is to allow a closer match between wages and firm-, sector-, or locality-
specific conditions. And, as the literature on many northern European countries indicates, 
changes in production regimes are just as likely to generate a shift toward lower levels of 
bargaining either through strategic choices on the part of unions or inter-class alliances against 
centralized bargaining (Thelen, 1991; Pontusson and Swenson, 1995; Iversen, 1996). 
  The micro-economically centered analyses offered by Regini and Rhodes are important 
in explaining the lack of support for a British-styled deregulation of labor markets in Italy and 
Spain. Yet they neglect another critical aspect of the recent experiences of these countries: the 
inability of employers to impose wage restraint and that of governments to end inflationary 
expectations in the absence of framework bargaining at the center. This failure of the 
institutional alternative to national level bargaining (relatively decentralized and fragmented 
bargaining coupled with a tight monetary policy) is reflected in the evolution of real wages and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Salvati, 1995: 76-95).    
unit labor costs in the 1980s and 1990s.  
In Italy, the incomes policy agreement of 1983 supported a substantial deceleration in 
wages and prices during the early 1980s. This disinflationary process continued through 1986, 
while Italian authorities combined a relatively moderate monetary stance with periodic 
devaluations (in 1985, and again, de facto, in the 1987 ERM realignment). Yet it came to a halt 
in 1987, when wage growth accelerated again, first in the public sector and thereafter in the 
private sector. The renewed rise in inflation led the Italian authorities to tighten their monetary 
policy while resorting to quantitative credit controls to stop capital outflows. Continued pressure 
on the lira, however, forced another currency realignment in January of 1990. After this 
experience, Italian authorities switched to a new strategy of trying to break the inflationary trend 
in wages by lifting all remaining capital controls, shifting the lira into the narrow 2.25 percent 
ERM band (from its traditional 6 percent band), and making a firm commitment to maintain this 
parity through whatever monetary policy measures were necessary. This new “strong currency” 
policy course resulted in a significant loss of competitiveness and a large widening of Italy’s 
current account deficit from 1989 to 1992. Yet, as Table 1 indicates, it had remarkably little 
impact on either wage growth or inflation.  
  A rather similar experience can be observed in the Spanish case. The inflationary surge 
in wages and labor costs that occurred during the initial stages of the transition to democracy 
was brought to an end by the 1978 Pactos de la Moncloa. Thereafter, real contractual wages not 
only stagnated but in fact declined for a number of years in the context of the incomes policy 
agreements signed by the UGT. This trend, however, came to an end in 1987, the first year not 
covered by a framework wage agreement. Real wage growth turned positive for the first time in 
almost a decade, but the relative moderation in wage settlements (i.e. decline in real unit labor 
costs) continued through the period 1986-88, while it looked like the concertation process might 
still be restored. After the breakdown of negotiations in 1988, however, real wage growth 
accelerated significantly, reflecting the effort by the unions to recoup some of the losses suffered 
during the previous decade.  
The acceleration in real wage growth in Spain at the end of the 1980s also occurred in 
the context of a very tight monetary policy stance. Interest rates were allowed to rise to such 
levels at the end of the decade as to make the peseta the strongest currency (closest to its upper 
band) in the ERM for almost three years following its 1989 entry into the system. Yet, as in  
Italy, this high interest rate/ strong currency strategy was remarkably ineffective in bringing 
consumer prices down. In fact, the unions were able to extract some of their highest real wage 
concessions from employers after the authorities raised interest rates even further in order to 
maintain the peseta in the ERM in 1992. 
 This background sheds an important light on the return to national bargaining and 
the accompanying institutional developments described above. In both Italy and Spain, 
governments sought to compensate for the lack of an incomes policy by relying on the 
external exchange rate anchor of the ERM and allowing interest rates to rise to unprecedented 
levels in order to impose wage discipline in a fragmented bargaining structure. This strong 
currency/high interest rate strategy seems consistent with the notion that, in the absence of 
truly encompassing and cohesive social actors, adequate wage adjustment is better achieved 
through the imposition of rigorous monetary policies than through attempts at centralized 
wage bargaining. What then explains the failure of this strategy?  
  One answer that is sometimes offered centers on the insider/outsider conflict in 
European labor markets. According to this argument, excessive job protection limits the 
responsiveness of wages to a decline in employment and, hence, austerity measures (see in 
particular, Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). However, econometric estimates of this “insider” effect 
on wages are not particularly persuasive as an explanation of the resurgence of inflation in Italy 
and Spain since they show lower measures for these countries than they do for other countries, 
such as Germany and Japan, with less inflationary dynamics (Espina: 272-73; Layard, Nickell, 
and Jackman, 1991: 407; Jimeno and Toharia, 1994: 78-80). A second explanation offered by 
economists involves specific institutional features of wage bargaining said to have reinforced a 
wage-price spiral, most notably, the scala mobile in Italy and the widespread practice of 
negotiated, backward indexation clauses in Spain (OECD, 1996: 66-67). This kind of 
explanation, however, is also problematic. A steady disinflation was possible in both countries 
prior to 1987 in spite of these institutional features. In fact, backward indexation clauses did not 
prevent real wage losses in Spain while national framework agreements were in effect (Table 1). 
And, in Italy, the protection afforded by the scala mobile was being progressively diluted in the 
period just prior to the pick up in inflation (Bertola and Ichino, 1995). 
  The reversal in the Spanish and Italian disinflation processes at the end of the 1980s is 
better explained by two other factors, both of which turned out to be exacerbated by the heavy  
extent to which governments relied on the monetary and exchange rate levers in their attempt to 
impose wage and price discipline. The first of these factors was the limited effectiveness of 
monetary policy measures in the context of increased international capital mobility.
9 With the 
lifting of capital controls in the late 1980s, the monetary policy course pursued by the Italian and 
Spanish authorities had the effect of producing massive inflows of short-term, speculative 
capital that sought to take advantage of the two countries’ high interest rate differentials vis à vis 
other ERM countries (Pérez, 1997: 169-73; OECD, 1990: 30-32; 1991: 43-45). These capital 
inflows were more volatile in the Italian case then in the Spanish, due to periodic crises of 
confidence in Italian public finances. Yet they had roughly similar effects. They made it 
extremely difficult for monetary authorities to retain a grip on domestic liquidity levels because 
they created a self-feeding cycle in which interest rate hikes intended to send a signal to 
domestic wage bargainers provoked a rise in short-term inflows, which in turn required further 
interest rate increases, which encouraged further inflows, and so on.  
The second consequence of the attempt to impose wage restraint unilaterally through 
monetary policy measures in the context of a fragmented and uncoordinated wage bargaining 
structure involved shifts in the sectoral dynamic of prices and wages in the two economies. The 
capital inflows that Italy and Spain’s high interest rate differentials generated in the late 1980s 
produced a significant appreciation of the lira and the peseta over the period 1987-1992, in both 
nominal and real terms (OECD, 1991: 42). This appreciation (and concomitant loss of 
competitiveness) was not just an unintended consequence of economic policy. It played an 
instrumental role in the macro-economic strategies pursued by the two governments. The 
strategy was premised on the notion that currency appreciation would discipline wage growth by 
forcing employers in exposed sectors to resist higher wage demands and, at the same time, 
contribute to disinflation by cheapening imports (Pérez, 1998; OECD, 1992: 21, 28). Yet these 
expectations were undermined by the extent of the shift of resources away from exposed and 
competitive sectors toward sheltered and less competitive sectors, and by the growing 
divergence between the evolution of prices in tradeables and non-tradeables. These trends are 
illustrated in Table 2, which shows the widening difference between consumer and producer 
                                                 
9 The incompatibility of an independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates, and high capital 
mobility (the so-called Mundell-Fleming condition) has long been recognized by economists and 
is discussed in Frieden (1991).  
prices in the two countries. Over the period 1985-1992, the consumer price index for services 
(i.e. non-tradeables) exceeded that for producer prices (i.e. tradeables) by almost 50 percent in 
Italy and 60 percent in Spain. By contrast, the divergence between these two measures for the 
same seven year period was only 10 percent in Germany.  
The sectoral price divergence also had an impact on the wage-bargaining process in the 
two countries. The attempt to impose disinflation by allowing the currency to appreciate was 
premised on the notion that bargaining in exposed sectors would set the pace of wages 
throughout the economy. This notion was partially based on past experience. Although 
bargaining in neither Italy nor Spain was ever as clearly dominated by an export sector leader as, 
for instance, in Germany, industrial wages did tend to lead other wages up until the mid 1980s. 
In the context of a fragmented and increasingly decentralized bargaining structure, the heavy 
reliance on a tight monetary policy in the late 1980s, however, seems to have had the opposite 
effect of that intended: it downgraded the role of the exposed sector in the bargaining round and 
allowed bargainers in sheltered sectors to set wage standards.  
In Italy, at the end of the decade the pattern became one in which very large wage 
increases in the public sector fed through to wages in industry in the following round. In the 
Spanish case, where public sector wages are more tightly linked to budgetary decisions, it was 
predominantly the service and construction sectors that took on this role (Locke and Baccaro; 
OECD, 1993: 19; OECD, 1992: 22, 67; OECD, 1994: 73; Raymond Bara, 1992: 58077). This 
shift in wage leadership may partly have reflected a union response to the new policy-course. 
Yet, significantly, the sectors that came to take the lead in wage setting were also the ones over 
which the national labor confederations had the least control. In Spain, the level of unionization 
in the service sector, for example, was only half that in industry. And in Italy, the rise in public 
sector wages at the end of the decade was driven largely by the presence of autonomous unions 
and grass-root committees (so called COBAS) formed by high-skill workers who were 
unwilling to restrain their wages as part of a the confederal unions solidaristic wage strategy 
(Richards and Garcia Polavieja, 1997; Locke and Baccaro). 
The attempt by Spanish and Italian authorities to impose discipline in a fragmented 
bargaining system through a very tight monetary policy thus had several perverse effects. It 
provoked speculative capital inflows that negated the ability of monetary authorities to control 
domestic liquidity. It encouraged a shift of resources to those sectors of the economy least  
exposed to foreign competition, rendering the economies more rather than less inflation-prone. 
And it downgraded the role of exposed sectors in the wage-setting process. This last effect not 
only played havoc with the assumption that disinflation could be imposed by placing pressure on 
bargainers in exposed sectors. It also undermined the capacity of the national unions to exercise 
control over wage trends; a capacity that would have been required to allow the exposed sector 
to exercise a leading role in wage setting.  
These tendencies were not reversed until the forced devaluation of the lira and the peseta 
in the 1992 ERM crisis. The crisis imposed a heavy toll in terms of employment in both 
countries. But its effects on the course of prices and wages were remarkable. The devaluation of 
the currencies ended the sharp divergence between the prices of tradeables and non-tradeables 
that had taken place since 1987, and this, in turn, made possible a resumption of the disinflation 
process that was interrupted in the late 1980s. The differences between the two cases, however, 
are also telling. The devaluation of the Italian lira, which was forced to leave the system, was 
more significant than that of the peseta, allowing for larger competitiveness gains and a quicker 
economic recovery. The peseta was kept in the system at the cost of very high interest rates. 
Wages also responded far more quickly in Italy, thanks to the 1992 agreement with the unions. 
Spanish wages continued to rise during the 1993 stand-off between the government and the 
unions over labor market reform, and only adjusted downward after the resumption of 
centralized negotiations between employers and unions in 1994. The cost in terms of 
unemployment was also much higher in Spain than in Italy (an additional 8 percent rise over 
1992-94 compared to a less than 1 percent rise over the same period in Italy). 
In both countries, governments thus had to face the limits of a unilateral use of monetary 
policy in their effort to impose wage discipline. The failure of this policy course explains the 
heavy effort that governments invested in seeking a return to bargained incomes policy in the 
1990s. In Italy, Carlos Ciampi (governor of the Bank of Italy) observed as early as 1988 that 
monetary policy measures alone were proving insufficient to preempt excessive wage 
settlements and that a new incomes policy agreement would be needed to bring inflation under 
control. Five years later, as prime minister, he would insist on the point in his efforts to 
convince Confindustria to accept union demands during negotiations for the 1993 incomes 
policy accord (Financial Times, June 29, 1988 and June 28, 1993). In Spain, on the other hand, 
the first serious effort by the PSOE government to reach a new agreement with the unions 
followed a stiff warning by the IMF that an incomes policy agreement would be necessary to  
control inflation, given the apparent insensitivity of wages to the Bank of Spain’s interest rate 
policy. The so called “competitiveness pact” proposed by the government, which was 
rejected by the unions, centered on the objective of setting two to three year national wage 
targets (Financial Times, April 20 and May 10, 1990; La Vanguardia, May 20).  
To be sure, these efforts to embark on a new policy strategy to control inflation through 
incomes policy accords were more successful in Italy than in Spain, where the failure of 
negotiations in 1993 prevented a rapid adjustment in wages and contributed to the severity of the 
economic crisis. The inability to reach a new agreement during the PSOE’s last term had much 
to do with the extent to which trust between the parties had been eroded by the experience of the 
1980s, when the unions saw the possible benefits of their wage restraint undermined by an 
excessively tight monetary stance.
10 Yet it also reflects an important degree of inconsistency in 
the PSOE’s own strategy in the early 1990s: an inconsistency illustrated by the fact that, while 
the government sought desperately to reach a new incomes policy agreement, it maintained its 
deregulatory approach to labor market reform (as reflected in the 1994 reform of the Worker’s 
Statute which seemed intended to facilitate a more decentralized bargaining structure) and a 
monetary stance that remained very strict by comparison to Italy. The conservative government 
that took office in 1996, by contrast, seems to have taken a lesson from the PSOE’s experience. 
It backed the 1997 agreement between employers and unions with fiscal concessions and placed 
pressure on the central bank to pursue a more measured monetary policy stance, allowing the 
unions to see the benefit of their compromises in terms of more vigorous employment growth.  
While the failure to combat inflation by way of monetary policy measures led 
governments to seek a return to national incomes policy agreements, the experience of 
employers in the 1987-1992 period is crucial in understanding the efforts to consolidate and 
articulate the underlying structure of collective bargaining. Having favored a decentralization of 
bargaining toward the firm-level in the 1980s, employers in exposed sectors found that they 
were not able to exact wage restraint in a context in which settlements in sheltered sectors came 
to set the pace of inflation. The problem reached beyond the contentious issue of indexation 
mechanisms such as the scala mobile and negotiated compensation clauses in Spain because 
inflationary wage settlements in the public and service sectors would come around to influence 
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wage demands in industry even in the absence of indexation as long as bargaining remained 
fragmented. During the 1993 negotiations in Italy, Confindustria thus sought to institutionalize 
“a single locus of collective bargaining at the national level”(a proposal that was rejected by the 
unions who insisted on retaining a secondary role for lower bargaining units).
11 Similarly, in 
Spain the national employer confederations (the CEOE and the small and medium-sized firm 
confederation, CEPYME) have been the principal agents (along with the sectoral union 
federations) behind the move to limit the fragmentation of the bargaining system and to give 
precedence to national sectoral bargains over lower level bargains.
12  And although more 
recently (during the negotiations of the 1998 patto di Natale) Confindustria proposed a shift to 
single-level bargaining at the firm-level (subject to national incomes policy agreements tying 
wages to European inflation), this proposal appears to have been simply a tactical maneuver to 
avoid adoption of a counterproposal forwarded by the CISL that second-level bargaining at the 
firm level to distribute productivity gains over and above wage rates agreed at the national 
sectoral level be made a requirement in all firms. 
13 
  The experience of the unions has been more complex than that of governments and 
employers. Yet, it too ultimately contributed to the return to national social bargaining and to the 
efforts to consolidate the underlying structure of collective bargaining. In both Italy and Spain, 
the concertation episodes of the 1980s came at a significant cost to the national confederations, 
although this cost took different forms. In Italy, the wage compression that resulted from the 
                                                 
11 Locke and Baccaro, p.  299. The desire to re-centralize bargaining reflected Cofindustria’s 
efforts to coordinate the bargaining stances of its affiliates. Regini and Regalia, p.222.  See also 
the statements of Cofindustria’s  chief economist, Stefano Micossi,  Financial Times, July, 7, 
1992. 
12 One CEOE study indicates that national sectoral bargains yielded lower salary increases than 
provincial or regional (autonomous community) levels bargains, although the lowest salary 
increases were those agreed in firm-level bargains. CEOE, Balance de la Encuesta, p. 52. Firm-
level bargaining, however, is largely restricted to large multinationals, utility, and 
telecommunication companies. According to both CEOE and union representatives interviewed 
by the author in Madrid during October and November of 1998, most Spanish employers did not 
want to move to firm-level bargaining because it is simply too costly for them.   
13 One of Confindustria’s main representative in the patto di Natale negotiations, Giorgio Udai, 
explained in an interview with the author, that the final agreement to retain the structure agreed to 
in 1993 had much to do with the fact that most medium and small sized firms needed the 
national-sectoral bargains as “protection” from excessive wage demands that they would not be 
able to resist at the firm-level.    
1975 scala mobile accord produced wide spread discontent among skilled workers and gave rise 
to the sindicati autonomi and the COBAS, which grew significantly in importance over the 
course of the 1980s (Locke and Baccaro). In Spain, the absence of a wage compression 
mechanism such as the scala mobile prevented the emergence of rival local unions. Nonetheless, 
the concertation agreements of the 1980s came at a heavy cost to the UGT, which was held 
responsible for the decline in real wages incurred in the 1980s; a decline widely seen to have 
failed to produce any economic benefits.
14 The UGT lost the position of dominance at the plant 
level gained in the course of the political regime transition, and its subsequent alliance with the 
CC.OO was intended to end this trend by embarking on a common, more militant stance in 
wage bargaining.  
  Given the costs that concertation carried for the unions in the past, their role in the return 
to national bargaining seems harder to understand. The social bargains of the 1990s have, 
moreover, involved major concessions by national union leaders (the abandonment of the scala 
mobile in Italy, that of high dismissal costs for permanent workers in Spain). The explanation for 
the unions’ willingness to return to the process might of course lie in the greater willingness to 
compromise on the part of governments and employers in the 1990s, and in the generalized 
political pressure not to miss out on EMU.
15 
More than these conjunctural factors, however, seems to have been at play. The 
concessions of the national unions in the two countries were also motivated by the realization 
that the regulatory framework that they had defended for so long was eroding their own position 
in the labor movement and their ability to act as strategic actors in the economy. In Italy, the 
scala mobile was not only driving the rise of the COBAS and sindicati autonomi representing 
skilled workers. It also reduced the significance of the confederations in the life of all workers 
by sharply narrowing the room for negotiation in wage bargaining. Conversely, by replacing the 
scala mobile with a centralized incomes policy framework, the confederal unions managed to 
vastly increased their importance in the life of workers, a shift that was reflected in plant level 
elections following the 1993 accord, in which the confederal unions as a group unions gained 
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when they are exercising informal control over wages in line with expected inflation. 
15 In Italy, that pressure was augmented by the collapse of the postwar party system, which for a 
while turned the social partners into the de facto guarantors of Italian democracy. Salvati (1995).  
around 90% of the vote (a significant increase from previous years).
16 And, although the labor 
confederations opposed Confindustria’s proposal for a single, national level of wage bargaining, 
the consolidation of bargaining to just two (as opposed to multiple functional and territorial) 
levels also bolstered their ability to control the course of wage-negotiations, as reflected in the 
remarkable moderation in wage-growth since 1992.   
In Spain, on the other hand, the dramatic increase in unemployment following the 1992 
currency crisis gave increased credence to the notion that the unions represented a shrinking 
fraction of “insiders” in the labor market at the expense of the unemployed. In reasserting a 
stance of coordinated wage moderation and agreeing to a reduction in dismissal costs for new 
permanent workers, the unions were seeking to stop the downward spiral in employment. But 
they were also seeking to counter their perception as insiders and to redress the duality between 
a shrinking body of permanent workers and a growing proportion of temporary workers that was 
undermining their position as representatives of Spanish labor (Richards and Garcia Polavieja, 
1997).  Moreover, by the early 1990s, national union leaders also recognized the perverse effects 
of the fragmented bargaining structure inherited from the past and the need for a more 
centralized bargaining process to face the challenges of further economic integration in the EU.
17  
In various ways, the pressures of economic integration in Europe thus led the key actors 
to seek a return to national-level negotiations, as well as a consolidation and coordination of the 
underlying structures of bargaining. The inability of governments to impose wage and price 
restraint in a fragmented bargaining context through a tight monetary stance  led public officials 
to seek new incomes policy agreements with the unions: a search that proved successful in Italy, 
less so in Spain. (Nonetheless, as I have pointed out, there is evidence of an informal incomes 
policy process since 1994). Employers, meanwhile, had to come to terms with their inability to 
control labor costs in the context of an economic policy that placed far greater pressure on prices 
in exposed sectors than it did on prices in sheltered sectors, allowing the latter to set the pace of 
nominal wage increases. This has led employer associations to seek to consolidate bargaining 
                                                 
16 Locke and Baccaro, p. 292. This was accompanied by reorganization of work place representation 
that allows for further internal democracy within the labor movement and has helped to re-legitimize 
the confederal unions as representatives among workers.  
17 Interviews with Julian Ariza (CC.OO) and Manuel Garnacho (UGT), Madrid, October-
November, 1998. See also UGT, Anuario, p. 233.  
structures so as to allow them to exercise greater coordination in their negotiations with the 
unions. Meanwhile, the unions have been led back to the bargaining table by their realization 
that the old industrial relations framework that they had been committed to defending was 
eroding their own position as economic and social actors. They have thus chosen to give up past 
statutory guarantees (such as the scala mobile in Italy and high dismissal costs in Spain) in 
return for devolution of authority to the collective bargaining process and a reassertion of the 
role of national confederations, and national (as opposed to local or regional) sectoral 
federations, within that process. 
Contrary to the view that the effort to re-centralize bargaining was a temporary 
phenomenon tied to the goal of participation in EMU, the preceding discussion also 
suggests that it is likely to persist in these two countries in the future. While the goal of 
participation in EMU may have strongly encouraged the efforts of governments and employers 
to reach new agreements with the unions, the fundamental problems that led all three parties to 
seek (or agree to) a resumption of framework bargaining operated independently of the EMU 
deadline. The general tendency for the least competitive sectors to take the lead in wage-setting 
when national unions and employers do not exercise coordination at the center is likely to 
persist. And the need to maintain the external competitiveness of national economies vis à vis 
the rest of the EMU area will increase because devaluation will be ruled out as a mechanism for 
adjustment in labor costs. This is likely to encourage all national actors to reinforce whatever 
institutional solutions have proven most effective in sustaining competitiveness in the past. In 
the case of Italy and Spain, this implies a continuation of national-level bargaining on wages and 
other issues.  
IV. Lessons of the Southern European experience for Collective Bargaining under 
EMU 
The experiences of Italy and Spain may help us to understand the future course of 
collective bargaining in Europe in two different ways. First, the course of collective 
bargaining in the two countries over the last two decades may offer a microcosmic 
example of the likely interaction of monetary policy and wage bargaining under EMU.  It 
does so in the sense that these countries went farther than most other member states in 
allowing collective bargaining to default to a much more fragmented bargaining  
structure, and also in attempting to rely on a tight monetary policy to impose wage 
discipline within this fragmented bargaining context.  The second kind of insight that we 
may draw from the experiences of Italy and Spain concerns the role that these countries 
are likely to play in any attempt to restructure collective bargaining throughout the EU in 
response to EMU.  
First, the experiences of Italy and Spain suggest that EU governments and 
employers may come to face strong reasons to seek a consolidation of collective 
bargaining under EMU, in order to allow for better coordination between wage 
bargainers and the monetary authority, and in order to give externally-exposed sectors 
more leverage over the pace of nominal wage growth. The decision by governments and 
employers in Italy and Spain to allow a decentralization of wage bargaining in the period 
leading up to the 1992 currency crisis was premised on the idea that wage moderation 
could be achieved in such a bargaining structure through the imposition of a tight 
monetary policy.  Yet this strategy badly misfired, leading these actors to seek to re-
structure collective bargaining in favor of national-sectoral bargains under a national 
incomes policy framework. While some of the recent work on the relationship between 
monetary and wage bargaining institutions argues that a non-accommodating monetary 
policy stance serves to reinforce wage moderation and employment in wage bargaining 
context with an intermediate level of centralization (see in particular Iversen, 1998), the 
Italian and Spanish experiences of the late 1980s and early 1990s thus reflect a different 
aspect of the relationship between monetary and wage bargaining institutions. They indicate 
the limits of an activist monetary policy when wage bargaining (still within that intermediate 
category) is relatively fragmented and the bargaining parties lack an autonomous capacity to 
coordinate wages across sectors. 
There is reason to believe that these experiences may offer a preview of the way 
in which wage bargaining in other EU countries may be affected by the move to EMU. 
There were three important elements in the failure of the monetary policy experiments 
undertaken in Italy and Spain at the end of the 1980s.  The first was that higher interest 
rates and an overvalued currency (two key elements of the strategy) gave rise to 
speculative capital inflows which undermined the ability of authorities to control  
monetary magnitudes and gave rise to vicious circles in interest rate policy.  With low 
interest rates elsewhere in the industrialized world, any aggressive attempt to impose 
wage discipline in EU-wide bargaining through a proactive interest rate policy could very 
well have a similar effect. Secondly, and more importantly, the Spanish and Italian 
attempts to impose wage discipline in a fragmented bargaining context also failed 
because, in the absence of some alternative mechanism of coordination in bargaining, the 
strategy allowed sheltered sectors in the economy (i.e. sectors not affected by the rise in 
the currency that followed from high interest rates) to set the pace of inflation and 
nominal wage growth.  Thirdly, and related to the second phenomenon, was the fact that 
the intense reliance on a non-accommodating monetary policy in a fragmented bargaining 
context undermined the ability of national union confederations to mediate the interests 
of exposed and sheltered sectors in the wage setting rounds because it augmented the 
disparity in the market constraints faced by wage negotiators in the two sectors.    
The latter two effects have been largely overlooked by the architects of EMU. Yet 
they are likely to present themselves as obstacles to the achievement of macro-economic 
objectives in the EU after monetary union.  Although EMU may increase competition in 
some markets for goods and services, it will also render the EU a more closed economy 
in the sense that a lesser proportion of economic activity will be vulnerable to changes in 
the value of the currency. This lessens one of the key elements (the threat of appreciation) 
through which a non-accommodating monetary policy stance is said to have contributed 
to wage moderation in Germany.
18  In a more fragmented bargaining context in which 
currency appreciation threatens a lesser proportion of workers, the ability of union 
leaders to respond in a coordinated fashion to central bank signals and to mediate the 
interests of exposed and sheltered sectors is also likely to diminish. This is so, first, 
because, in the absence of an established structure of coordination in wage setting at the 
EU-level, unions even in the largest countries will represent a smaller proportion of 
workers, and will hence be unable to act on the assumption that other unions in the area 
                                                 
18 Although the ERM lessened the threat of currency appreciation to the extent that German 
exports were directed at the rest of the EU, currency realignments within the system (and its 
eventual collapse in 1992/93) maintained that threat alive for the German export sector.   
will respond in kind to a rise in interest rates.  It is also so, however, because the 
exposure of lesser segments of economic activity to the threat of currency appreciation 
will make it more difficult for national union leaders to impose the kind of nominal wage 
restraint that is consistent with the interests of exposed sectors.  Indeed, there is a real risk 
that in the new, more fragmented bargaining context of EMU, any pro-active use of 
monetary policy measures to impose wage and price restraint throughout the area will 
further undermine the capacity of national union leaders to impose wage restraint because 
it will encourage sheltered sectors (or sectors now less at risk of currency appreciation) to 
take the lead in the wage bargaining round. This is what occurred in Italy and Spain at the 
end of the 1980s and early 1990s. And it may be part of what has driven the considerably 
more aggressive bargaining stance adopted by German unions (in particular in the metal 
and chemical sectors, which previously had much to fear from DM appreciation) since 
the beginning of 1999 (see EIRO, 1999a). 
All this suggests that, while EU policy-makers and employers have been focusing 
on rendering labor markets more flexible through reform of labor laws in the run-up to 
EMU, they may become increasingly interested in promoting a re-organization (and more 
specifically, a consolidation) of collective bargaining in the area. Barring a radical 
deregulation of labor markets that would lead wage bargaining conditions in the EU to 
approximate those of the US (a prospect that is unlikely), the success of any ECB 
chartered policy course will depend on the existence of a bargaining structure that allows 
for a significant degree of coordination among the ECB and wage bargainers, and that 
allows unions to pursue wage norms that mediate among the interests of exposed and 
sheltered sectors. From a theoretical standpoint, such objectives would be best achieved 
by raising the level at which wage norms are set from the national and sub-national levels 
at which most bargaining now takes place to the European level. It could involve some 
sort of global, framework wage bargaining arrangement (such as the new incomes policy 
frameworks established in Italy or Belgium), or simply a bargaining structure in which 
European-sectoral level bargains would set wage norms for lower level bargaining. Such 
an upward shift would allow the ECB to focus its monetary policy signals on one or two 
lead sector at the European level. And it might also, by making for a more encompassing 
wage bargaining structure, allow a greater voice to companies with heavy extra-EU  
exposure who are sensitive to the issue of an overvaluation of the Euro.  
There are indications that such an upward shift in collective bargaining to the EU 
level is not an entirely unthinkable prospect.  Led by the German sectoral federations, the 
national union confederations of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg 
signed an agreement in September of 1998 committing them to coordinate their 
bargaining strategies. The so-called Doorn declaration set out a general norm to guide 
future wage claims: namely, that wage demands be based on the sum total of cost-of-
living changes and labour productivity increases in the four countries, in order to make 
up for past sacrifices and to pre-empt the threat of regime competition under EMU. The 
Doorn declaration was followed in December of 1998 by the adoption of a "European 
coordination rule" by the European Metal Workers Federation, which stipulates that 
“national collective agreements should seek at least to offset the rate of inflation and 
ensure that employees' incomes reflect a balanced participation in productivity gains, and 
by a resolution adopted at the 9
th Congress of the ETUC  in July of 1999 that calls for a 
generalization of such cross-border coordination in wage bargaining in order to produce a 
“European solidaristic pay policy,” although it leaves the development of such 
arrangements to the European industry federations (see EIRO, 1998, 1999b).
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The idea that EMU requires a restructuring of collective bargaining in the EU also 
seems to be gaining currency with policy-makers. The European Commission has for 
some time now been encouraging a process of top-level talks between the European 
social partners (ETUC and UNICE) to address major issues in the area of work-place 
regulation, leading to three major framework agreements (parental leave in 1996, part-
time work in 1997, and fixed-term work in 1999. More recently, it has also begun to 
promote a debate on Europeanizing collective bargaining structures in the EU.  And, in 
referring to the Italian collective bargaining system, the Italian Prime Minister, Massimo 
d’Alema recently seemed to back the idea (promoted by the head of the CGIL, Sergio 
                                                 
19 Four other European sectoral federations (private services, textiles, printing and paper, and 
building and woodworking) have also reached protocols on moving toward European-wide 
sectoral bargains and/or coordination rules, although there is substantial divergence in the degree 
of autonomy that these agreements leave to national sectoral federations.   
Conferatti) that national level collective bargaining would in the future have to give way 
to European level bargaining, in order to respond to the new macro-economic framework 
established by EMU (put in Il Sole reference). 
However, while there has been a flurry of proposals and agreements on cross-
national coordination of collective bargaining among European unions, and increased talk 
of Europeanizing collective bargaining by EU policy-makers, the likelihood of a move to 
a wage-bargaining structure centered at the European level remains remote.  As a recent 
review of developments in member states carried out by the European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO) documents, such a move faces the virtually unanimous 
opposition of European employers. This opposition is stated most adamantly by German 
and Swedish employers, who have been backing a further decentralization of bargaining 
in their respective countries. But it is also evident among employers in other member 
states (EIRO, 1999b). Representatives of the national employer confederations 
interviewed by this author in Italy and Spain seemed to accept the notion that a shift to a 
European level of bargaining represents a logical extension of the move to a single 
monetary authority (interviews Madrid May, 1999, and Rome, June 1999). However, 
these same employer representatives adamantly ruled out the possibility that such a 
development could take place in the short or medium term. As the head of the Industrial 
Relations and Social Affairs Department of Confindustria put it, the move to European-
level collective bargaining is “a prospect, but a very, very long term prospect.” 
Significantly, a similar view was expressed by representatives of several national sectoral 
union federations in the two countries, even though Spanish and Italian confederal 
leaders had backed the call by German unions for greater coordination in bargaining at 
the last ETUC congress (interviews Madrid, November 1998, Rome, June 1999).  
Indeed, while the recent experiences of Italy and Spain illustrate the failure of 
attempts to impose wage and price restraint through a pro-active monetary policy in a 
fragmented bargaining context (and in this sense the motivations that may lead employers 
and governments to seek an upward consolidation of bargaining in the EU), those same 
experiences also suggest that there are serious obstacles to such an upward consolidation 
in the structure of wage bargaining if this is to include the economies outside the former  
Deutschemark zones.  Both employers and unions in Italy and Spain for now are 
primarily interested in consolidating the move to national-sectoral level bargaining 
undertaken in recent years. And they see any attempt to raise wage bargaining (though 
not necessarily bargaining on other issues) to the European level as an obstacle to the 
achievement of this goal. (The employers will say so outright. The unions, by contrast, 
will pay lip service to the goal of European-level bargaining in order to avoid regime 
competition, but when pressed on a timetable will respond almost exclusively on the 
obstacles that stand in the way of such a shift). Indeed, any attempt to approach the kinds 
of wage norms pursued recently by German unions might very well threaten the headway 
made in institutionalizing a new framework of national negotiations and industrial 
relations in the two countries.  
 Such reactions on the part of the national social actors might simply be attributed 
to the desire of these organizations to maintain their own primacy in the collective 
bargaining process rather than cede it to European organizations that are dominated by 
other national confederations. A closer look at recent developments in the EU, however, 
suggests that there are other, even weightier reasons. Foremost among these is the 
difficulty that European unions face in agreeing on wage-norms that could serve as the 
basis for a collective bargaining process coordinated at the European level and extending 
beyond the former Deutschemark zone. This is illustrated by the divergence in wage 
norms that has characterized national-level bargaining in different member states of the 
EU since the onset of EMU. The position of German unions in the latest wage 
negotiations has been consistent with the Doorn declaration. They began the 1999 
bargaining round seeking real wage growth that would capture increases in productivity 
at the sectoral level with claims ranging between 5.5% and 6.5%, and they managed to 
reach settlements averaging around 3.1% (based on the 3.2% agreement reached in the 
pattern setting, metal sector agreement signed in February (EIRO, 1999a). By contrast, in 
Italy and Spain, where bargaining during the recession years had centered on minimizing 
real wage losses, recent negotiations have focused simply on achieving small real wage 
gains. As an example, the Italian Metal sector union recently sought, and achieved, a 
1.5% annual wage increase for 1999 and 2000.  The notion of fully capturing productivity 
at the sectoral level has in fact been abandoned in Italy, where national sectoral  
agreements now focus on compensating for inflation, while the distribution of 
productivity increases has been left to the second level of bargaining (but is applied 
typically only in the largest firms). It is also considered far-fetched in Spain, where the 
unions have accepted the notion that declining unit labor costs are a prerequisite for 
reducing current unemployment. Contrary to the call for “an end to modesty” pronounced 
by the German unions at the beginning of 1999, recent wage claims in Italy and Spain 
thus have reflected an acceptance by the unions of the notion that, without recourse to 
devaluation, excessive wage settlements translate directly into a loss of competitiveness, 
with direct consequences for employment.  
Indeed, while the implementation of EMU creates an a priori problem of 
fragmentation in wage bargaining that will make it difficult for the ECB to choose a 
target among wage bargainers and may thus eventually lead all parties to seek a shift of 
bargaining to the European level, it also entails powerful incentives that run counter to 
such a shift. It does so in particular by highlighting the connection between wages and 
national competitiveness, and by involving national unions in “national competitiveness 
alliances.” Thus, while the initiatives pushed forward by the unions (in particular the 
German unions) within the ETUC have focused on achieving coordination in bargaining 
to avoid the perils of regime competition, the primary impact that EMU has so far had on 
collective bargaining in the member states has been that of promoting national social 
pacts. These national social pacts in many cases have come to make direct reference to 
European parameters, and in this sense may be thought to represent a form of 
Europeanization of bargaining (see EIRO, 1999b). But they do so with an essentially 
competitive (or at least defensive), rather than an integrative, intent.  Examples of this 
range from the last inter-sectoral agreement reached between employers and unions in 
Belgium, which set a maximum wage increase for 1999-2000 based on assumed 
developments in Germany, the Netherlands, and France, to the adoption of a new 
“European inflation” rule in the latest Italian national social pact. Although the latter of 
these agreements seems to be more compatible with the notion of an eventual shift to 
European-level wage bargaining, the common thread to all of these agreements is that the 
national level of bargaining has come to viewed as indispensable tool to maintain  
national competitiveness in the absence of national monetary and exchange rate options.
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What conclusions about future of EU collective bargaining can we draw from this 
set of insights. On the one hand, the past experiences of the two Southern European cases 
suggests that European policy-makers and social actors should become interested in 
mitigating the degree of fragmentation in bargaining that currently characterizes the 
EMU area.  On the other hand, the difficulty in establishing common wage norms across 
economies with different underlying characteristics suggests that a shift in wage 
bargaining to the European level is unlikely, or at the very least, is not likely to be 
inclusive of the periphery of the EMU area. One possible solution, recently advanced by 
the Commission is that collective bargaining in the EU be coordinated at a regional level, 
bringing together regions in different member states that share certain fundamental 
characteristics (industrially advanced areas vs. economically lagging areas) rather than a 
sectoral level. Such a regionalization scheme, however, has little support from national 
union confederations, who are still interested in using the collective bargaining process as 
a mechanism for achieving greater cross-regional equality. Nor is it likely to be supported 
by national employer federations in countries such as Italy and Spain, who have seen a 
direct connection between national-level bargaining and almost unprecedented levels of 
wage moderation in recent years. Italian employers recently decided not to support a call 
by a government-organized commission for a move to more regional- level bargaining in 
Italy, opting instead to support the existing two-level (national-sectoral/company-level) 
structure. And the experience so far in Spain has been that regional-level bargains, in 
both poorer and richer regions, yield higher wage settlements than are typically reached 
in national-sectoral negotiations (CEOE, 1999).  
The most likely effect of EMU on bargaining practices in the medium to long-
term is thus likely to be a reaffirmation of the move to national, and national-sectoral-
level bargaining initiated during the run-up to monetary union in many member states 
rather than a shift to a bargaining structure centered at the EU-level. Increased pressure in 
                                                 
20 Although not spelled out, the presumption in the Italian agreement was that the European 
inflation rate would in fact be lower than the local Italian inflation rate, so that the rule implied 
greater real wage moderation.   
favor of national bargains already became apparent in the first months of EMU, as the 
ECB struggled to agree on an inflation target, and as some countries (notably Ireland and 
Spain) began to experience a surge in inflation while the ECB cut its rates in response to 
price-signals from other economies. Experiences such as these suggest that national 
incomes policy pacts may well come to be seen as a more critical adjustment mechanism 
than ever before now that the possibility of adjustment through national monetary and 
exchange rate policies has been abandoned. Indeed, recent efforts to reach a national 
incomes policy agreement in Germany (within the context of the “alliance for jobs,” 
which the employers and government would like to extend to wages) suggest that such a 
model may become increasingly relevant in some of the more “organized” economies as 
well, as traditional modes of macro-economic governance are disrupted by the move to 
EMU.  
How would such a nationally-centered pattern of bargaining affect the 
achievement of aggregate macroeconomic (and in particular monetary policy) objectives 
under EMU? From the point of view of achieving coordination in bargaining, such a 
pattern might in fact render fairly positive results, if it allows the ECB to focus on a lead-
sector in a lead country (Germany), and if this national social pacts elsewhere aim 
primarily at maintaining levels of wage competitiveness in relation to that country.  At 
the moment, this is what appears to be emerging, with the signatories of the Doorn 
declaration (and in all likelihood France) seeking to match German wage levels, and 
other countries seeking to compensate for excess inflation. However, the cohesiveness of 
such an informal model of coordination depends heavily on a number of conditions. The 
first is the current scenario, in which the countries of the periphery (with the notable 
exception of Italy) appear to be in a more expansionary phase, while the core has required 
interest rate cuts. (Bargaining arrangements in the periphery would not likely be able to 
compensate for an overly tight monetary policy stance the way that they may for an 
overly loose one).  The second is the behavior of unions in the core countries, in 
particular as it relates to the potential conflict between exposed and sheltered sectors 
(which as we have noted, may well be aggravated as larger segments of the economy are 
less affected by a currency appreciation).  The third, finally, is the maintenance of 
relatively centralized collective bargaining regimes in all countries, and the consolidation  
of bargaining in countries such as Italy and Spain (as without cohesive national wage-
bargaining regimes, coordination on a lead country/sector would not be possible).  Thus 
ironically, the principal threat to the ECBs operation might come precisely from a further 
decentralization of wage bargaining, such as is commonly advised by those who advocate 
in move to a U.S.-style competitive labor market in the EU.  
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Table 1 Contractual Hourly Wages, Inflation, and Real Wages  
percentage change over previous year 
 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Spain       
contractual 
wages  
12 11.4  7.8 7.9 8.2 6.5 6.4 7.8 8.1 7.9 7.2 5.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 
CPI  14.4  12.2  11.3  8.8 8.8 5.2 4.9 6.8 6.7 5.9 5.9 4.6 4.7 4.7 3.6 
real  wage  growth  -2.4  -0.8  -3.5  -0.9 -0.6 1.3  1.5 1 1.4 2 1.3  0.8  -1.3 -1 0.2 
Italy        
contractual 
wages 
17.0  15.2  11.5  10.7 4.8 6.5 6.1 6.1 7.3 9.8 5.4 3.7 3.3 3.1 1.8 
CPI  16.4  14.9  10.6  8.6 6.1 4.6  5  6.6 6.1 6.5 5.3 4.2 3.9 5.4 3.8 
real  wage  growth  0.6 0.3 0.9 2.1 -1.3 1.9 1.1 -0.5 1.2 3.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -2.3 -2 
Sources: CPI: OECD, Economic Outlook; Contractual hourly wages: Spain: OECD, Economic 
Survey(various years);Italy (industrial sector only): OECD,  Main Economic Indicators, various years 
 